| The Role of Religion in U.S. National Security Policy since 9/11 |
|
 |
 |
 |
|
by Chaplain (Colonel) Jonathan E. Shaw, United States Army The struggle to locate that framework has taken the U.S. down a number of roads since the turn of the millennium, none of which has been totally satisfactory. President George W. Bush viewed freedom as a universal value, with religion as the preeminent freedom characterizing free, robust societies. With these assumptions, he viewed post-9/11 conflict with the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a battle over freedom. He believed that repressed Iraqis and Afghans would welcome the U.S. military as liberators bringing greater freedom, to include freedom of religion. President Bush’s assumptions were only partially validated. Part of the problem was the dissonance between a western concept of freedom to choose and worship God over against an Islamic concept to submit to God. “Religion as Freedom” did not offer the optimal framework. Neither has President Barack Obama’s “Religion as Unity” framework solved the problem. President Obama has asserted a universal value regarding religion—that all religions are united by a moral law to care for one’s fellowman. Based on this assumption, President Obama has labeled radical Muslim terrorists as false Muslims, and also launched initiatives to honor Islam and resolve mutual misunderstandings through dialog with Muslim states. His efforts have succeeded partially, but radical traditionalist Muslims continue to fight, believing they are the pure practitioners of the faith. Also, President Obama’s framework has not accounted for the large numbers of Muslims in Muslim-majority countries who find terrorism ever justifiable. An additional framework is needed, one that understands religion as power which is comprehended in grand strategy, and religion as behavior which is addressed in policy. To begin to derive such a framework, it is helpful to look forward, to project the potential scope of the interplay between religion and national security. An examination of the enduring role of religion in human conflict through the eyes of Alvin Toffler, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Kaplan proves helpful. Toffler, Fukuyama, Huntington, and Kaplan articulate different visions of the current and future world, with varying views of national security challenges. Each author, however, includes religion as a critical component in policy that would address those challenges effectively, and highlights Islam within that process. Current and projected U.S. national security challenges highlight the need to explore Islam’s historical, theological, and political roots and traditions. Such an exploration suggests that the central issue for Islam is its universalization. One may identify six partially overlapping positions, or schools of thought, within Islam today, each of which attempts to address the problem of Islamic unity. These positions are found among both U.S. adversaries and partners in current overseas contingency operations. Islam today is far from monolithic. It is manifested in many forms, reflecting multiple perspectives on how the faith is to achieve its universalization, on what jihad means, and on when, if ever, terrorist tactics are justifiable in defense of Islam. Traditionalist conceptions of Islam maintain the continuing applicability of Shari’ah as state law, and the potentiality for jihad as warfare, with an average of over 20 percent of Muslims in Muslim-majority nations finding terrorist acts at times justifiable in defense of Islam. Liberal and post-modern reformists, on the other hand, generally condemn violent jihad and seek peaceful relations with the West. An accurate assessment of Islam as power will inform that grand strategy and strategic vision on which effective national security policy rests. A review of the national security policies of Presidents Bush and Obama demonstrates the incredible difficulty of bringing religion to bear within national security policy. Weighing the alternative paradigms of Religion as Freedom, Religion as Unity, and Religion as Ideology, the last paradigm appears to offer the greatest utility. It calls for a strategic vision that comprehends the power of Islam, it enables a nuanced understanding of Islamic groups based on their behavior, it facilitates a diversified continuum of policy rewards and consequences based on that behavior, and it refrains from violating the American tradition of the federal government neither advocating for nor judging a religion. If religion is to gain currency within national security policy, many practical matters will need to be addressed. For example, how should religion impact campaign design, campaign planning, and strategic communications with internal and external audiences? Relative to various positions within Islam, U.S. policy makers will need to understand the conceptions of universalization to which various Islamic positions aspire. Even more, policy makers will need to determine how much active support or passive space the national interests of the United States can afford or allow toward the fulfillment of those aspirations. Knowing the parameters could amount to a national security imperative. Finally, that religion will continue to matter, and matter a lot, in the national security challenges of the United States may be a bitter pill for secularist western liberals to swallow. Certain political advisers, academics, and senior leaders of the professions of arms may find it difficult to believe that many 21st century people are still motivated by religion, and that some are even willing to fight and die for their beliefs. Their incredulity is easy to document. National security policy statements, academic texts on cultural frameworks, and even military manuals on counterinsurgency doctrine can discuss their subject matter without examining religion as a power which motivates human behavior. The day has come to rethink assumptions and reengage in these critical arenas. When it comes to formulating national security policy today, religion may be regarded as the elephant in the room—we all know it’s there, but nobody really wants to talk about it.1 On the one hand, some U.S. policy makers and advisers have had concerns about granting religion a place at the table because its subject matter might not be appropriate. On the other hand, those who have been struggling to find a way to integrate religion into the post-9/11 discussion of national security have not yet found a fully satisfactory framework. For some people, the perceived subjectivity of religion makes it an inappropriate element for national security policy. Some view religion as mere subjective preference, shaping personal choices about God and right and wrong. In contrast, they view national security policy as objective decision making, employing elements of national power against a real adversary. But consider Sun Tzu’s strategic dictum: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in danger.”2 Here the so-called subjectivity-objectivity polarity collapses in favor of a subject-object distinction: know your enemy and know yourself. But what is such knowledge other than the perception of deeply rooted identity, values, interests, and sources of power—which, more often than not, touch on or even flow from religious traditions? Others dissent from including religion within national security policy out of concern for compromising what many call “the American separation of church and state.” Because religion is spiritual, promoting an inner life springing from God—they argue—wouldn’t it be improper for the United States to speak to religion within its national security policy? Carl von Clausewitz’s anthropological framework for war suggests otherwise. In his paradoxical trinity, the people supply the emotions and passions of war.3 Because human emotions and passions are frequently founded on religion, why wouldn’t national security policy discuss the motivational power and effects of religion? Still others judge religion to be too privatistic and idealistic to contribute anything meaningful in the national security world of deadly force and cut-and-thrust maneuvering. We must remember, however, that it is a distinctively liberal, western view that conceives of religion as a private affair divorced from daily life. Most societies see religion as related to individual identity, societal formation, and national values. Religion provides humanity with a framework for understanding the world, human meaning, and human conflict. Religion of necessity speaks to war and its conduct.4 In his masterpiece, The Quest for Holiness, Adolf Köberle sets forth the trajectories of the various world religions in their attempts to fulfill the human aspiration to overcome the pathos of this world. Köberle identifies this aspiration as humanity’s desire for sanctification—for acceptance and holiness before God.5 His introduction reads like a primer on human need which can drive to violence and perpetuate human conflict, and in that sense, like an introduction to the problem of national security. The desire for sanctification is always first aroused in man when he has become conscious, in some painful way, of his lack of peace and the erring restlessness of his life. So the experiences of age and suffering, of sickness and death that surround us. . . . the realization of our moral weakness and uncleanliness, the continually repeated neglect of our duties toward our neighbor awakens a desire for supernatural strength and purity. . . . These are the momentous hours when we have come to the point that secular values can no longer satisfy us; when the need of aspiring to God is recognized and we unite in the longing cry that is the hidden theme of all human history: “Dona nobis pacem.”6 That religion and national security policy largely share a common base—the experience of human suffering, failed duties toward one’s neighbor, the hunger for enduring values, and the desire for peace—suggests an integrative approach for religion within national security policy. But how should religion and national security policy be integrated? If there is a place at the table for religion, where should it sit? If religion is to enter the discussion, it must not do so in the form of advocacy, promoting one religion over another.7 Nor may it do so in the form of judgment, ruling on the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of a religion. Rather, religion must enter the discussion in the form of behavior. Behavior matters—whether it is motivated by religious faith, nationalist commitment, or an empty stomach. And because behavior can support the interests of the United States or attack them, protect innocents or take their lives, our security requires that we understand behavior. Religion is critically needed now in our national security discussions. We need to understand more clearly the way that religion can shape and motivate behavior. When it comes to our security, the behavior of our friends and our adversaries matters terribly. Religion—not as a standard of belief, but as a power which drives human behavior—must be at the table if national security policy is to embrace the fullness of the human situation, formulate effective concepts, and yield enduring results. There is room for both a more nuanced consideration and a more comprehensive treatment of religion in U.S. national security policy. We need a workable framework that will provide such nuance and integration. The struggle to locate that framework has taken the U.S. down a number of roads since the turn of the millennium, none of which has been totally satisfactory. President George W. Bush viewed freedom as a universal value, with religion as the preeminent freedom characterizing free, robust societies. With these assumptions, he viewed post-9/11 conflict with the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a battle over freedom. He believed that repressed Iraqis and Afghans would welcome the U.S. military as liberators bringing greater freedom, to include freedom of religion. President Bush’s assumptions were only partially validated. Part of the problem was the dissonance between a western concept of freedom to choose and worship God over against an Islamic concept to submit to God. “Religion as Freedom” did not offer the optimal framework. Neither has President Barack Obama’s “Religion as Unity” framework solved the problem. President Obama has asserted a universal value regarding religion—that all religions are united by a moral law to care for one’s fellowman. Based on this assumption, President Obama has labeled terrorists as false Muslims, and also launched initiatives to honor Islam and resolve mutual misunderstandings through dialog with Muslim states. His efforts have succeeded partially, but radical traditionalist Muslims continue to fight, believing they are the pure practitioners of the faith. Also, President Obama’s framework has not accounted for the large numbers of Muslims in Muslim-majority countries who at times find terrorism to be justifiable. An additional framework is needed, one that understands religion as power which is comprehended in grand strategy, and religion as behavior which is addressed in policy. This paper proposes to locate that framework by examining the role of religion in national security policy since 9/11, dividing the topic into four parts.8 Part I helps define the potential scope of the interplay of religion and national security by projecting the question into the future. I examine the work of four recent historiographers, with special attention to their visions of the current and future world, and the role of religion with regard to human conflict.9 Because the US is currently engaged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan—both Islamic countries—part II provides an excursus on the power of Islam. As the religion of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but also of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and many other US allies, Islam is the religion under discussion today in matters of national security. In this section I explore the power of Islam by examining its history, different forms of jihad, various approaches to achieving Islamic unity, alignments within radical Islam and terrorist operations, and demographics that bear on Islamic identity and the extent of support for terrorism. In part III, I examine the role of religion within the national security policies of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Based on their approaches, I present and evaluate two paradigms for integrating religion within national security policy—“Religion as Freedom” and “Religion as Unity.” I then offer a third paradigm—“Religion as Ideology”—in an attempt to relate a strategic vision which comprehends the power of Islam and translates it into a policy which accounts for religious behavior. Part IV provides a summary and addresses certain practical questions that would need to be answered if the United States moves toward a comprehensive framework for religion, using the paradigm of Religion as Ideology. What changes might occur at the strategic and operational levels of war? What might be the way ahead?
Part I. Historiographical Projections on Human Conflict and Religion
To understand the interplay between religion and national security, one may either look backwards across history to assess past connections, or forward from today to project future connections.10 I have chosen the latter way, as this allows an anchor point in the current but evolving geopolitical world, with its well-known national security challenges. The four authors I survey—Alvin Toffler, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Kaplan—have proposed perhaps the most compelling alternative visions of the future world written in the past thirty years. Each advances his own paradigm, through which he offers a distinctive view of history and projects a future world.11 To a greater or lesser extent each author discusses his understanding of the causes and projected occurrences of violent conflict, and the attendant role of religion. I include this survey not to critique their works, nor to claim that their works were written to prove a connection between religion and national security interests; I use their works to explore the relationship between religion and human conflict, within a set of possible futures, in order to project back a present-day azimuth for national security policy alternatives which consider the role of religion. Alvin Toffler12 Toffler locates the seeds of human conflict within his concept of wave confluence. Confluence occurs when a new wave crashes into the previous wave, producing a new situation, a new synthesis, a new civilization. Such new civilizations reflect more than paradigm shifts for ordinary societal labor—from agriculture to industry to technological science. More critically, every new civilization “develops its own ‘super-ideology’ to explain reality and justify its own experience.”16 According to Toffler, struggle is the inevitable result of two waves crashing together, each with its own super-ideology. For Toffler, this explains the violent conflict—within states and between states—that occurred at the confluence of the First and Second Waves.17 Similarly, as the Second and Third Waves collide, The decisive struggle today is between those who try to prop up and preserve industrial society (Second Wave) and those who are ready to advance beyond it (Third Wave). This is the super-struggle for tomorrow. Other, more traditional conflicts between classes, races, and ideologies will not vanish. They may even—as suggested earlier—grow more violent, especially if we undergo large-scale economic turbulence. But all these conflicts will be absorbed into, and play themselves out within, the super-struggle as it rages through every human activity.18 This decisive struggle is intensified because the Third Wave has brought tremendous ideological challenges, including religious challenges. In the Second Wave, the typical citizen retained long-term commitments aligned with the majority.19 In the Third Wave, civilization now “makes allowances for individual difference, and embraces (rather than suppresses) racial, regional, religious, and subcultural variety.”20 The resultant stress is “tearing our families apart . . . shattering our values.”21 Toffler notes that this shift in ground rules has led many to pursue fundamentalist religion to find “something—almost anything—to believe in,”22 and to join religious cults in order to locate “community, structure, and meaning.”23 In short, Toffler treats the subject of religion not as a body of beliefs, but as a manifestation of the confluence of Second and Third Wave ideologies; not as a source of absolute truth, but as a proof of the fragmented values of Third Wave civilization; not as a majority-based morality to guide society, but as a pattern of minority-based power within society.24 This reading of Toffler suggests that religion—especially as fleshed out in fragmented, smaller faith communities—will become increasingly vocal and powerful. Effective Third Wave governments will include religious groups as stakeholders, much as they would any minority power base within their ruling coalition. The policy implication for Toffler seems to be that it is wiser to include religion as a dynamic, societal force, than to omit it and risk irrelevancy or failure. Indeed, his interpretation of the 1979 Iranian Revolution offers a good illustration of how Third Wave national security policy may ignore religion only to its great peril: Nurtured by the West, attempting to apply the Second Wave strategy, . . . [the pre-revolution] Teheran government conceived of development as a basically economic process. Religion, culture, family life, sexual roles—all these would take care of themselves if only the dollar signs were got right. . . . Despite certain unique circumstances—like the combustive mixture of oil and Islam—much of what happened in Iran was common to other countries pursuing the Second Wave strategy.25 Francis Fukuyama26 The historical process that would lead to universal liberal democracy, Fukuyama maintains, runs on the twin engines of economics and the human struggle for recognition. The former represents the simpler case for Fukuyama, given the power of technology and the “universal horizon of economic production possibilities.”31 The latter is more complex. Man’s desire to be recognized as possessing dignity and worth—in particular, his desire to be recognized as desirable, i.e., recognized as greater than his fellowman—has led to an historical chain of slave and master identities, and to war itself.32 Within this construct, Fukuyama finds religion, and also nationalism and other forms of ideology, to be penultimate fulfillments of the human struggle for recognition.33 Because religion can end up perpetuating slave and master identities,34 it presents an obstacle to forming liberal democracies which alone give full expression to the non-negotiable principles of “liberty and equality.”35 Fukuyama admits his historical method and anthropological assumptions generate analytical problems as humanity nears the final destination of history. If humanity and society separate themselves from their ideological foundations and commitments, how will this affect their ability to sustain themselves internally and engage the world externally? It is to this question we now turn, briefly considering difficulties in the areas of anthropology, sociology, and international relations. This line of inquiry will help sketch a preliminary picture of the role of religion and national security implications in Fukuyama’s projected future. On the anthropological side, Fukuyama believes that the most probable danger is that “the creature who reportedly emerges at the end of history, the last man”36 will lose his passions, his ability to strive, and cease to be a true man. Having been indoctrinated that the birthright of every human is absolute freedom and absolute equality at absolutely no personal cost, the last man will have lost the capacity to make ultimate commitments and, therein, his capacity to be human.37 Fukuyama also warns of the opposite, less likely, danger—humanity jettisoning the entire project of liberal democracy due to its loss of absolutes. Religion, nationalism, and ideologies would then drive a history which had not ended, and whose demise had been prematurely projected.38 On the sociological side, within the United States, those private associations which previously enabled debate and built strength within liberal democracies would be so emptied of religion and other ideological causes that the public good, as the politically-negotiated coherence of privately-held rights, might well collapse.39 Where tolerance requires being open to all belief systems, it unavoidably attacks the normative character of any one system. Fukuyama’s surprising solution is to re-empower personal ideology, to include religion, in order to make liberalism sustainable. He argues: No fundamental strengthening of community life will be possible unless individuals give back certain of their rights to communities, and accept the return of certain historical forms of intolerance. Regarding international relations, because societies and states are located at different distances from the end of history41—with some still retaining robust religious, nationalist, and cultural ideologies—the U.S. would still need to practice foreign relations so as to engage the power of religion in those lesser developed societies where it remains the decisive, or at least a not-yet-marginalized, power.42 Here Fukuyama singles out the Islamic world. At the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy. . . . Outside the Islamic world, there appears to be a general consensus that accepts liberal democracy’s claims to be the most rational form of government.43 For Fukuyama, Islam would seem to merit special attention in national security policy. He represents Islam as an ideology that attracts those who are already “culturally Islamic,”44 that possesses “its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice,”45 and that has “defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world, posing a grave threat to liberal practices even in countries where it has not achieved political power directly.”46 To sum up, these difficulties seem to suggest a conclusion that runs counter to the overall direction of Fukuyama’s thesis. My reading of Fukuyama is that his projected post-historical United States would of necessity retain religion as a power within society and as a lens for addressing national security issues for that society. Thus, religion would remain a critical component of effective foreign policy in Fukuyama’s future world, to meet the challenges of external threats, internal associations, and enduring anthropological distinctions. Samuel P. Huntington47 ...the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural.... People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations.50 Identifying seven or eight such civilizations,51 Huntington concludes that “in the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.”52 Huntington calls such clashes “fault line wars.”53 Religion plays two key roles within Huntington’s paradigm. First, religion largely defines a civilization, and is usually its most important objective element.54 Huntington quotes English historian Christopher Dawson: “The great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest.”55 Second, because religion is so significant for defining civilizations, religion frequently serves as a critical driver in fault line wars. Consider the religious components in Huntington’s most likely and most dangerous fault line wars. At the “micro level” (localized wars), Huntington sees violent fault lines “between Islam and its Orthodox, Hindu, African, and Western Christian neighbors.”56 At the “macro level” (global wars), Huntington assesses the worst conflicts as occurring “between Muslim and Asian societies on the one hand, and the West on the other.” Overall, he projects that “dangerous clashes” (wars of greatest violence between states or entities from different civilizations) will result from the clash of “Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness.” Religion provides fuel for Huntington’s future wars.57 Because Huntington explicitly names Islam as a civilization likely to clash in micro, macro, and dangerous wars, a further word is in order. Huntington reviews significant historical, political, cultural, and religious data as he makes his case for the likelihood of continued Islamic civilizational violence. His evidence may be grouped in three, overlapping areas: the Islamic Resurgence,58 Islamic consciousness without cohesion, and the intercivilizational Islamic-western clash. First, Huntington documents an Islamic Resurgence59 wherein multitudes of Muslims have turned to Islam for a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and...hope epitomized in the slogan “Islam is the solution."...It embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world.60 This Islamic Resurgence he characterizes as a mainstream and pervasive civilizational adjustment vis-à-vis the West, aimed at returning Muslims to “a purer and more demanding form of their religion.”61 Powerful demographic trends such as large Islamic migrations to cities, exploding youth populations, and economic problems have played no small part in this Resurgence. Huntington believes that although this Resurgence will produce many social gains, it will leave unresolved “problems of social injustice, political repression, economic backwardness, and military weakness,” thus fueling future conflict.62 Second, Huntington considers the implications of a strong transnational Islamic consciousness that exists without cohesive power.63 Huntington finds that traditional Islamic commitments to “the family, the clan, and the tribe,” as well as to “unities of culture, religion, and empire,” are producing a strong and widespread Islamic consciousness.64 What is lacking today, however, is a core or lead state, or transnational power structure, to effect Islamic cohesion. The result has been instability through competition among aspiring Islamic states, sects, and transnational actors, each seeking to gain popular Muslim support to expand its own base and reach of power. For Huntington, this instability and competition increases the potential for conflict within Islamic civilization, and between Islam and other civilizations. Finally, Huntington addresses what he views as the basic clash of Islamic and western civilizations.65 Huntington tracks a stormy relationship between these civilizations across 1,400 years of history, with conflict flowing from “the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them.”66 He documents that “the argument is made that Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword,” that it has expanded by use of force when strong enough to do so, and that it has refused to grant equal protection under the law to adherents of other religions.67 Beyond such historical and theological concerns, Huntington lists current trends which have contributed to the clash: increases in Islamic population, unemployment, and the number of disaffected youth; greater Islamic confidence over against the West through the Islamic Resurgence; the West’s abrasive policies of universalizing its culture and meddling in conflicts in Islamic lands; the fall of communism, against which the West and Islam had made common cause; and increased intercivilizational contacts between Islam and the West, which have magnified intolerances between the two.68 Huntington’s view of the future is clear: religion as the preeminent cultural factor defining civilization will play a central role in any effective national security policy.69 Whatever the normative prejudices of the reader, whether one admits to the possibility of meaningful differences between religions and moral frameworks, or not, the data Huntington cites in order to demonstrate points of friction between civilizations based on religion, must be taken at a minimum as points of data regarding differences in human behavior, flowing from cultural differences between certain state, sub-state, and transnational identities. That such differences in behavior, irrespective of differences in belief, may lead to violence and war implies the criticality of addressing religion as behavior within national security policy.70 Robert Kaplan71 In Kaplan’s coming anarchy, the population will largely be divided into the “haves” and the “have nots,” based on the nature of the devolving world. Kaplan writes that “we are entering a bifurcated world” populated by “Fukuyama’s Last Man” and “Hobbes’s First Man.”73 The former presents the few—post-modern humanity which is well educated, well fed, dominant in technology, and successfully separated from the brutish world. The latter presents the many—entrapped humanity which is surrounded by anarchy, living in poverty, engulfed in cultural strife, and doomed to failure by environmental privation.74 The polarities of Kaplan’s future world imply that religion relates to concepts of security and stability in two different ways. First, Hobbes’s First Man lives his brutish life in the throes of contradictory cultures, extremist ideologies, and religious constructs. For such a First Man, Kaplan’s view is that although religion can sometimes be a positive force—contributing to individual empowerment, cultural identity, and societal order—more often religion is a negative force—undermining stability and fueling conflict. It is in this context that Kaplan discusses Islamic violence.75 My reading of Kaplan suggests that although he sometimes interprets violence between Islamic peoples as springing from religious grounds, more frequently he perceives such Islamic violence as rising out of a cultural clash, with religion being subordinated to a specific Muslim culture. So it is that Turks may distrust and clash with Iranians, for example. That said, the cultural differences between Islam and the West are yet greater than the cultural differences within the House of Islam, so that in clashes between Islam and the West, a broader Muslim identity takes precedence. This is not to suggest that Kaplan agrees with Huntington’s thesis of a monolithic Islam clashing with western civilization.76 Rather, Kaplan’s view is that Huntington has oversimplified the matter and misidentified the clash. The clash is not between Islam and the West, but properly within Islam, or more precisely, within the patchwork of competing ethnic groups and cultures which self-identify as Islamic; and then, only in a derived sense, between Islamic groups and cultures and the West. But the role of religion in the life of the First Man is yet more complex. This is because Kaplan subordinates all such ethnic and cultural Islamic violence to his thesis of the coming anarchy. Kaplan describes “Islamic extremism [as] a psychological mechanism of many urbanized peasants threatened with the loss of traditions in pseudomodern cities where their values are under attack.”77 He sketches Islam as a religion bringing happiness to “millions of human beings in an increasingly impoverished environment,”78 but whose “very militancy makes it attractive to the downtrodden. It is the one religion that is prepared to fight.”79 Thus for Kaplan foundational militancy within Islam is subordinated to the broader cultural identity, which in turn is subordinated to the environmental struggle of the First Man. From his perspective, the secular government of modern Turkey presents an outstanding success story of an Islamic culture driving toward moderation and modernity, effecting vital order and infrastructure within an Islamic society, “making it much harder for religious extremists to gain a foothold.”80 Thus, in Kaplan’s world of the First Man, religion will play a pivotal role in personal identity, cultural clashes, and the broader environmental struggle. Religion, especially as an enabler of culture, will empower the broader struggle seeking to gain control of critical resources, in hopes of securing a modicum of security and stability. Second, consider Kaplan’s appropriation of Fukuyama’s Last Man. Although this suburbanized, well-fed, and self-satisfied man may have no personal need of religion, he will still have a policy need of religion. If only to achieve the ends of improved international stability and his own security, he will still need to influence the other strife-filled world where religion is valued. Kaplan makes the related policy point that the United States may have to learn to connect with cultures with which it holds little in common. It may sometimes be in the best interests of the USA to support authoritarian regimes in acute need of social stability and economic development, though not yet ready for democratic elections and still perpetuating systems of injustice.81 Borrowing from James Madison in The Federalist, Kaplan suggests that American global engagement will likely best promote stability in fragile societies and governments by focusing on their “regional, religious, and communal self-concern.”82 Thus the Last Man’s foreign policy will still need to address the priorities of the First Man, to include his religion. Toffler, Fukuyama, Huntington, and Kaplan all articulate different visions of the current and future world, with varying views of national security challenges. Each author, however, includes religion as a critical component in policy that would address those challenges effectively, and highlights Islam within that process. Specifically how religion might be treated within national security policy—as a mark of freedom, a symbol of unity, or an expression of ideology—I address in part III.
Part II. The Power of Islam
First, however, it is important to give some direct attention to the religion of Islam. This would seem to be necessary for at least three reasons. One, Islamic terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11. Two, the Taliban and Al Qaeda continue to use the religion of Islam as a rallying cry against the United States and the West. Three, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and many other US allies are Islamic countries. These data points raise a particularly challenging question. How are Americans to comprehend the influence and the nature of a faith that is held by some of our most aggressive adversaries, but also by some of our most valued friends? This is the confusion that many Americans feel about Islam, and it is a confusion that cannot be clarified until we are willing to look more closely at the faith and its divisions. That religions have divisions within them is not unusual. Judaism may be divided into Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed. Christianity may be divided into Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Episcopal, Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and many other denominations. What is unusual about Islam is that the divisions are extraordinarily complex and represent fundamentally different visions of how the faith is to achieve its universalization. Yet we must understand Islam with its various divisions if we are to understand Islam as a power which motivates behavior. We must understand the faith dimension to derive the policy implication.83 Authoritative Documents84 There are many approaches to studying Islam, but one helpful way is to begin with a review of its authoritative documents and then move to its history. Unlike Christianity, Islam emphasizes practice over belief, law over proclamation.85 Accordingly, Islam considers its authoritative source documents as supremely important. The primary authority in Islam is the Qur’an, revealed from 610 to 632 of the Common Era (CE) and considered to be “the eternal, uncreated, literal word of God, revealed one final time to the Prophet Muhammad as a guide for humankind.”86 The Qur’an reveals information about Allah as the radically transcendent, divinely omnipotent and omniscient God, who alone is God, who in himself is Unity; however, the Qur’an does not reveal God, for God is beyond all grasp and comprehension. Rather, the Qur’an reveals God’s universal will or law for all humanity.87 Stylistically the surahs, or chapters, of the Qur’an are composed of dramatic and shifting forms, and not chronological narrative.88 Surahs may be divided based on where the revelation was received—in Mecca or in Medina.89 The secondary authority in Islam is the Sunnah, composed of the words, deeds, and judgments of Mohammad, to include community practice flowing from the Prophet’s example.90 This form of customary law was written down by Muhammad’s Companions, with the written documents themselves called hadith.91 The sirah, or biographical accounts of Muhammad’s life, also lie within the category of Sunnah.92 Together the Qur’an and Sunnah form the basis of divine law, called Shari’ah.93 Meaning “straight path,” Shari’ah is that law in Islam that effects the rule of God and governs life—individual, community, and state. Shari’ah fuses the religious and civil worlds into one. Shari’ah is particularly instructive for the ummah, the one community of Islamic believers worldwide. Shari’ah tells the ummah what it means to be a Muslim. A document of lesser, but still significant, authority in Islam is the fatwa, a formal restatement, or new application, of Islamic law. Fatwas are the result of difficulties both in understanding certain texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and in applying those texts to new situations. Islamic legal scholars issue fatwas to address aspects of life ranging from prayer and discipline, to marriage and family, to war and politics. The perceived authority of a fatwa can depend on the faith community’s respect for the scholar and his reasoning in matters of casuistry. To enable resolution of interpretive difficulties, the Islamic legal tradition mushroomed. Principles of Islamic jurisprudence, or usul al-fiqh, established rules of interpretation, reasoning, precedence, and custom, to guide legal decisions.94 Siyar, the Islamic law of nations, also developed, detailing the Islamic law of war. Five legal traditions crystallized. Based on texts from the Qur’an and Sunnah and the extensive legal system, fatwas became a standardized way for leading legal scholars to shape and apply Islamic law.95 Brief Overview of Islam At Medina, Muhammad showed himself to be a wise and talented leader of the Medina community and his nascent ummah. The continuing revelations he received in Medina proved especially important for his religious and military future. Certain Medinan revelations to Muhammad established Islamic rites and practices as part of a universal religion. Other revelations authorized offensive military operations in order to achieve that vision. From Medina, Muhammad undertook a number of raids and battles, against neighboring tribes, caravans, Jews, and a force of thousands from Mecca. The trend line multiplied Muhammad’s power and wealth, and increased the number of those who submitted to Allah. The peaceful surrender of Mecca in 630 CE gave Muhammad undisputed control of the Arabian peninsula and religious hegemony based on his earlier order to expel all Christians and Jews. Before enacting a more expansive campaign to spread Islam through conquest, Muhammad fell ill and died in 632. Following the death of Muhammad, the faithful demonstrated their resolve to realize their Prophet’s universal vision of Islam. Islam experienced extensive growth by military conquest in the seventh and eight centuries. Even through the twelfth century, Islam continued to expand its rule, but it achieved this growth in an ebb-and-flow manner as European Christian powers began to achieve dominance. Still, at the height of its power Islam could claim Spain, parts of France and Italy, all of northern Africa, and large portions of Eurasia. That said, internal Islamic struggles for leadership, an ethos constrained by regimented commitment to the past, and the external European dynamism of the Renaissance projected a final wall which Islam would not breech. Islam’s defeat at the gates of Vienna on September 11-12, 1683 marked the end of Islam’s linear, contiguous warfare to achieve universality. The vestiges of the great Ottoman Empire, launched in 1291, finally faded away through defeat in World War I. A new era for Islam had begun. Before more thoroughly examining the claim that Islam initially expanded by military conquest in order to achieve its vision of universality, we must first note alternative views. Liberal scholarship and postmodern perspectives in the last century have articulated a transhistorical understanding of Islam’s universality in exclusively internal, spiritual terms.97 Other commentators have suggested that prudence precludes discussing a possible historical occurrence of Islamic militancy, to avoid aiding adversary recruitment or undercutting coalition building. Ibn Warraq sounds a cautionary note on bypassing history to satisfy ideology, especially ones own. Warraq quotes Isaiah Berlin, arguing that from the latent desire to “suppress what [one] suspects to be true...has flowed much of the evil of this and other centuries.”98 From this perspective, the hard investigation of history provides the surest way to the flourishing of humanity. Jihad In this section I document the initial concept of jihad in Islam, its interpretation through the authoritative principles of Islamic jurisprudence, and its application within the Islamic war of nations. In the following section of this paper, I trace modern interpretations of jihad that have arisen from reformed Islamic positions. My reading of Islam’s history, usul al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), siyar (the Islamic law of nations), and teaching on jihad (struggle or war) suggests that classical Islamic jurisprudence clearly accepted the proposition that Islam expanded by military conquest in order to achieve its goal of universality, as envisioned by the Prophet.99 To this one may add that the early emphasis on militaristic or external jihad was joined by a rising accent on spiritual or internal jihad, as the initial and stunning military advances of Islam slowed. Shaybani, born 750 CE, wrote Islam’s most famous siyar, detailing the authoritative understanding of the Islamic law of nations and classical Muslim notions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Shaybani’s siyar demonstrates the historical and theological connection of jihad to the goal of achieving a universal Islamic state. Majid Khadduri, arguably the foremost authority on Shaybani, comments The Islamic faith, born among a single people and spreading to others, used the state as an instrument for achieving a doctrinal or an ultimate religious objective, the proselytization of mankind. The Islamic state became necessarily an imperial and an expansionist state striving to win other peoples by conversion.100 Because the vision of a worldwide Islamic empire could not be achieved immediately, Islam needed to generate new law to govern the continued prosecution of war, the distribution of the spoils of war, and the relations of Islam with those states which had not yet been conquered. These necessities gave birth to siyar and defined its scope. Based on this scope, siyar assumed a state of hostility between the Islamic and non-Islamic world. The world was divided into two—dar al-Islam (the territory of Islam) and dar al-harb (the territory of war).101 Dar al-Islam was that part of the world ruled by Shari’ah, and dar al-harb was the military objective. The territory of war was the object, not the subject, of the Islamic legal system, and it was the duty of Muslim rulers to bring it under Islamic sovereignty whenever the strength was theirs to do so.102 This does not mean that siyar required continuous warfare against the dar al-harb. Although “the ultimate objective of Islam was the whole world,” expediency or temporary Islamic weakness might justify the halting of hostilities and a temporary peace.103 When opportunity arose, however, the Muslim ruler was expected to return to offensive operations and, by conquest, achieve a universalization of Islam. These offensive operations were by definition jihad. Khadurri notes: The instrument which would transform the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam was the jihad. The jihad was not merely a duty to be fulfilled by each individual; it was also above all a political obligation imposed collectively upon the subjects of the state so as to achieve Islam’s ultimate aim—the universalization of the faith and establishment of God’s sovereignty over the world.104 Hamidullah clarifies an important point. Jihad was not to be considered an individual duty in an absolute sense, but only in a derived sense, for jihad belonged to the state: Jihad is not considered as a personal duty to be observed by each and every individual, but only a general duty which, if accomplished by a sufficient number, the rest will no more be condemned for the neglect of that duty—this fact renders the administration of jihad entirely in the hands of the government. The practice of the Prophet also shows the same thing.105 Such an understanding of jihad as state-sponsored, chiefly offensive military operations raises eyebrows today. Liberal and postmodern reformed accounts of Islam largely bypass documentary and historical evidence from the initial centuries of Islam in favor of emphasizing Islam as a religion that has expanded through the attraction of its inherently peaceful, spiritual discipline. There is some evidence for each side, but most Qur’anic verses on jihad refer to actual fighting. Consider the following: Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him. . . . Rejoice in your transaction.106 To the above verses we must add the authoritative example of the Prophet, in support of understanding jihad as war. From the time he arrived at Medina until his death, Muhammad was a warrior. When words and other actions could not convince or coerce non-Muslims to submit to him as the Prophet of Allah, he regularly used warfare to advance Islam. Sometimes such warfare was brutal. Muhammad’s role in ratifying the 627 CE beheading of between six and eight hundred captured Jewish men is well documented in the hadith.111 His farewell address in March of 632 reflected a similar understanding of jihad: “I was ordered to fight all men until they say ‘There is no god but Allah.’”112 On the other side, there are Qur’anic verses, although significantly fewer, which emphasize jihad as a spiritual, inner struggle or striving. Examples include the following: And strive for Allah with the striving due to Him. He has chosen you and has not placed upon you in the religion any difficulty. [It is] the religion of your father, Abraham. Allah named you "Muslims" before [in former scriptures] and in this [revelation] that the Messenger may be a witness over you and you may be witnesses over the people. So establish prayer and give zakah [alms] and hold fast to Allah. He is your protector; and excellent is the protector, and excellent is the helper.113 Those who remained behind rejoiced in their staying [at home] after [the departure of] the Messenger of Allah and disliked to strive with their wealth and their lives in the cause of Allah and said, 'Do not go forth in the heat." Say, "The fire of Hell is more intensive in heat."114 There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.115 To these verses we must also add the later distinction of the “greater jihad” and the “lesser jihad.” In the ninth century, ascetic impulses within Islam began to merge into a mystical interpretation—Sufism—generating some documentation of a new distinction between a greater and lesser jihad. Although such documentation is absent from the authoritative hadith, Ninth century wisdom literature provides examples: A number of fighters came to the Messenger of Allah, and he said: “You have done well in coming from the ‘lesser jihad’ to the ‘greater jihad.’” They said: “What is the ‘greater jihad’?” He said: “For the servant [of God] to fight his passions.”116 We must note that there need not be a contradiction, strictly speaking, between the belligerent and irenic passages of the Qur’an; jihad may entail both.117 That said, there is undeniable dissonance between the Qur’anic passages which portray jihad as state-sponsored, offensive warfare used to expand Islam and achieve universality, on the one hand, and jihad as inner, spiritual striving used to build Islam through peaceful, spiritual discipline. The Islamic legal tradition of usul al-fiqh helps in part to resolve this dissonance. Within usul al-fiqh, the principle of naskh (abrogation) allows certain later passages of the Qur’an and elements of Shari’ah to take precedence over earlier passages or elements.118 This resolution rules out contradiction. Instead, based on the relative time of the revelations, the latter takes precedence over the former. In this way naskh has been used by some commentators to argue that the later, Medinan exhortations to wage war against infidels take precedence over and abrogate the earlier Meccan requirements to pursue only peaceful means.119 Terrorist Muslims continue to use naskh in this way as the basis in Shari’ah for their terrorist fatwas.120 Other modern commentators reject naskh to embrace earlier Islamic admonitions of peace. The Central Question for Islam—How Islam Is to Achieve Its Universalization In the initial stages of Islam, militant jihad was a critical component of life under Shari’ah. Dar al-Islam conquered large portions of dar al-harb, bringing Shari’ah to an ever-widening kingdom. But as the expansionist victories of Islam subsided, the realization of the Islamic vision of universality became problematic. A new approach to Islamic unity—other than military conquest to establish worldwide Shari’ah—seemed necessary. An evolving reality brought modifications to the previous jihad construct and to relations between Islamic and other states. Below I identify six partially overlapping positions, or schools of thought, within Islam today, each of which attempts to address the problem of Islamic unity. These positions are found among both U.S. adversaries and partners in current overseas contingency operations. Understanding these positions is a vital starting point for resolving related conflict and national security issues. My study of Islam suggests that Islam’s historic vision of its own universalization assumed that Shari’ah would one day rule all lands, that usul al-fiqh would remain authoritative for regulating the analysis of the legal sources and deducing the content of Islamic law, and that jihad as warfare would remain a legitimate mechanism to universalize Islam.123 Relative to this historic threefold vision, I identify six positions within Islam today.124 Those groups which retain this vision, albeit with some conditions and concessions to reality, I call traditionalists. I find three categories of traditionalists—radical, conservative, and neotraditionalist Muslims. Those groups which have left the traditionalist understanding, yet articulate another principle of Islamic unity that they apply to public and political life, I label reformists. I denominate two categories of reformists—postmodern and liberal. Finally, those groups which have retained allegiance to Islam as authoritative for personal faith and practice, yet reject any role of Islam in the political sphere, I refer to as secular-state Muslims. See Table 1 for a summary of the related nomenclature.125 Table 1. Islamic Positions Full Name of Islamic Position Shortened Name of Position Name of Adherents Radical traditionalist Islam generally sees no need to change from Islam’s historic assumptions regarding the universalization of the faith. Radical Islamic groups desire a return to Islam as it was practiced in its first centuries, seeking the expansion of Islam through Shari’ah, applying usul al-fiqh, and leaving open the possibility of militant jihad. The roots of radical Islam as a revivalist movement were sown by the 18th century work of Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led by Shi’i Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni, and the 20th century evolution of Salafism as a movement containing increasing numbers of radical Muslims.126 Today, radical Muslims are present around the world and affiliated with scores of Islamic groups and countries, to include Shi’is from Hezbbollah and Iran; and Sunnis from Hamas, Fatah al-Islam, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other Wahhabist derivatives, to name but a very few.127 Radical Muslims frequently demonstrate hostility not only toward the West, but also toward those Muslims whom they judge to be apostate or corrupted.128 It is important to distinguish radical Islam from terrorism. As a defined group, radical Muslims are not all terrorists. That said, many within this group are terrorists.129 By terrorists, I mean those who aim violence against innocents, in order to create fear and advance their political ends. The use of terror as a tactic is highly problematic within the Islamic tradition. Qur’an 2:195 and 4:29 are often quoted as proof that terrorist suicide operations are forbidden in Islam.130 Cook, however, cites a number of Islamic legal rulings and Qur’anic verses used by terrorists to argue just the opposite. Terrorist radical Muslims distinguish between “suicide operations” and “martyrdom operations,” and view martyrdom as a way to leverage minimal resources to achieve both maximum damage against the enemy, and eternal reward for the martyr.131 Conservative traditionalist Islam shares with radical Islam similar commitments to Shari’ah, usul al-fiqh, and jihad, but makes greater concessions to geopolitical realities. Here one finds a realist perspective on traditionalism. Khadduri is in many ways representative of such conservative Muslims. He seeks no reevaluation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and no reformulation of Shari’ah, for he is content with the traditionally deduced law. He does, however, make concessions for Islamic nations vis-à-vis the international community and the power of the West. He argues that just as jihad evolved from imperialist expansion to defensive war due to the growing strength of adversaries, even so the Islamic principle of unity has had to evolve.132 Khadduri tracks an accompanying change from the goal of a universal Islamic state, to a system of Islamic nations no longer at permanent war with the West, to the goal of an Islamic bloc of nations in common cause cooperating within the community of nations.133 Here we find a conservative vision of unity founded not in Westphalian nationalism, but in the ummah living under Shari’ah, and united with fellow-Muslims of other Islamic nation states. Conservative Muslim approaches to unity may be found in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and many other Islamic nation states. Neotraditionalist Islam also values Shari’ah, usul al-fiqh, and jihad within the historic Islamic tradition, but seeks to readjudicate the goals and objectives of Shari’ah, in order to better integrate Islam in the present. Like conservatives, neotraditionalists frequently envision the unity of Islam in terms of an Islamic bloc of nations together addressing the community of nations. But going beyond this, neotraditionalist Muslims seek an updated integration of Islamic tradition within their respective societies. Mohammad Hashim Kamali well represents the neotraditionalist Muslim position. His assessment is that over time usul al-fiqh became “a retrospective construct,” and “a theoretical, rather than empirical, discipline.”134 Over time, it fell short “of integrating the time-space factor into the fabric of its methodology.”135 As a result, usul-al-fiqh became literalistic, wooden, and incapable of bringing forward into present Islamic culture and society the original dynamism of the usul al-fiqh, Qur’an and the Sunnah. Kamali calls for a reevaluation of these sacred texts to capture anew ...their emphasis on justice, equality and truth, on commanding good and forbidding evil, on the promotion of benefit and prevention of harm, on charity and compassion, on fraternity and co-operation among the tribes and nations of the world, on consultation and government under the rule of law.136 Many Islamic movements may be described as neotraditionalist. These include the Muslim Brotherhood organizations found in many Islamic states, the Renaissance Party of Tunisia, the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, the Jamaat-i-Islami found in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and others.137 It is significant that although such organizations may be designated as neotraditionalist, their “neo” status does not preclude their potential support for militant jihad.138 Reformed positions within Islam conceive of a different approach to the unity of the faith. While retaining a high view of the Qur’an and Sunnah, reformed Islam distinguishes between sacred traditions which may be anchored in historical conditions, and enduring principles and values which may be projected across time into the present. On account of this, reformed Islam accepts only non-violent concepts of jihad and seeks fuller integration within a globalized, western world. Postmodern reformed Islam finds clear expression in the work of Tariq Ramadan.139 Many proponents of postmodern Islam focus on the Muslim experience in the West, and Ramadan is a good example. Ramadan’s goal is to articulate and apply universal principles for Islam which both respect pluralism, and enable Muslims to live out their faith in modern, secular societies.140 Based on his interpretation of Islamic sources and sciences, Ramadan identifies “three fundamentals of the universal at the heart of Islamic civilization,” namely, “the encounter with the Only One, the ‘full and natural faith’ of the created universe, [and] the ‘need of Him’ as the essence of being human.”141 These fundamentals bring changed conceptions of Shari’ah and jihad, and shift the concept of Islam unity from the external to the internal.142 This unity occurs first within the individual Muslim. First, “to be with God . . . all of us are required to return to ourselves and to rediscover the original breath, to revive it and confirm it.”143 From here, this unity is projected into society, because “one’s duty before God is to respond to the right of human beings.”144 This solidarity with society propels postmodern Muslims into a program of engagement for: the right to life and the minimum necessary to sustain it, the right to family, the right to housing, the right to education, the right to work, the right to justice, and the right to solidarity itself.145 From the postmodern Muslim perspective, this oneness, founded in the individual and projected into society, forms the basis of the universalized Islamic civilization.146 Liberal reformed Islam provides a vision similar to that of postmodern Islam, valuing the Qur’an and Sunnah, seeking enduing Islamic principles and values, and pursuing reform in the context of an increasingly modernized world. But beyond this, liberal Islam interprets the whole of the faith within the overarching categories of religious process and religious continuity. We will briefly examine both of these categories from the perspective of John L. Esposito, an ardent and articulate proponent of reformed Islam.147 Esposito locates Islam within the category of religious process in such a way that the historical underpinnings of the faith give way to deeper meanings which extend both backward and forward in time.148 Islam at its emergence was “a return to a forgotten faith.”149 As such, Islam was “not a new faith but the restoration of the true faith (iman), a process that required the reformation of an ignorant, deviant society.”150 Part of this reformation entailed jihad, a “struggle against oppression and unbelief,” which provides Muslims today “with a model and ideology for protest, resistance, and revolutionary change.”151 In short, Islam possesses a “transhistorical significance . . . rooted in the belief that the Book and the Prophet provide eternal principles and norms on which Muslim life, both individual and collective, is to be patterned.”152 Esposito also portrays Islam as participating in a great phenomenological continuity of world religion. Esposito praises what he perceives Islam, Judaism, and Christianity to hold in common—a heritage of monotheism, spiritual values, and peaceful proclamation.153 One might ask: what kind of reform will liberal Islam bring, being formed by religious process and continuity, and normed by enduring Islamic principles and values? The answers will vary, based on the realities of each Muslim society, but the process of contextualizing Islam within a globalized world will finally expand justice for Muslims across the domains of gender, economy, law, and politics, as Esposito sees it. As might be expected, western governments laud this vision and cheer the process. Finally, secular-state Islam reflects that position which retains allegiance to Islam as authoritative for personal faith and practice, but rejects the role of religion in the political sphere. Egypt and Turkey are two such secular states, which have attempted to travel the difficult road to modernity while honoring Islamic piety. Significant challenges continue today.154 Their societies view Shari’ah as applicable for the private and community practice of Islam, and as decisive for the true unity of Islam across the ummah. That said, Shari’ah remains officially excluded from the power relationships of government. In other words, although Islamic principles may permeate law, Shari’ah itself is not state law, and is not determinative for state relations. Based on this understanding of private faith practice and secular political power, Egypt and Turkey have found common cause with the United States and other western nations, and are vital partners within the community of nations. To summarize, the above six schools of thought represent varying approaches to the practice of Islam today. Most significantly, each position holds its own view on how the Islamic faith is to achieve its universalization. Understanding these positions is a prerequisite for policy makers who would address national security issues in the Islamic world. But to this understanding we must also add an awareness of the changing nature of coalitions within traditionalist Islam. Alignments within Traditionalist Islam Thomas F. Lynch III notes important differences in motivation and strategy that continue to surface when Sunni and Shi’ah groups each wage militant jihad on their own terms.155 He makes the case that Shi’ah terrorism emanates from the policy objectives of the state of Iran, and is executed as a campaign under the leadership of affiliates such as Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad Organization. This differs in form and substance from Sunni terrorism, which Lynch describes as being motivated by a “theologically-driven . . . grandiose, ideological framework” that is executed as a wave.156 Samuel Helfont would not disagree with Lynch’s thesis as far as it goes, but would add significantly to it. Helfont argues that if the task is “to assess the loyalties or predict the actions of various regional actors,” then at least in the Middle East the dividing line in Islam lies within traditionalist Sunni Islam, with groups siding either with Wahhabism or with the Muslim Brotherhood.157 As evidence, he points out that in both the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon, and in the 2008 Israeli-Hamas conflict in Gaza, regional politics did not divide along Sunni-Shi’i lines. Instead, ...Shias from Hezbollah and Iran sided with Sunni Islamists from Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood associated organizations. On the other side of the regional divide were Sunni Arab Nationalists, traditional Sunni monarchs, and Sunni Islamists with Wahhabist tendencies.158 For Helfont, these represent the enduring alignments of Middle East Islamic power. Helfont shows that these two streams of Sunni Islam differ greatly today. Wahhabism and their affiliated groups, such as al-Qaeda, hold to radical traditionalist Islam.159 They are motivated chiefly by theology, desiring to purify Islamic faith and practice by restoring radical traditionalist concepts of Shari’ah. Toward that end, radical Wahhabist organizations have endorsed jihad as offensive warfare against both the West and those Muslims deemed to be impure or corrupt.160 By way of contrast, Helfont characterizes Muslim Brotherhood organizations as chiefly political.161 Willing to work with Shi’i and even non-Islamic groups if necessary, Muslim Brotherhood organizations seek to consolidate adequate power locally and regionally to build modern political systems that respect human rights while retaining an Islamic identity. Falling far short of the theological commitments of radical and even conservative Islam, the neotraditionalist Muslim Brotherhood is dedicated to political reform, concerned with western perception, and committed to building viable, modern Islamic states. Just how different the Brotherhood can be from Wahhabism is shown in their approaches to jihad.162 Given justifiable circumstances, the Brotherhood will employ any tactic of terrorist jihad, from suicide bombings to children as human shields, but only so long as the tactic may be construed as defensive. Their concerns for western perception and political settlement remain high. Wahhabists will also employ any terrorist tactic, but are willing to include jihad as offensive warfare because they see their warfare as divinely ordained. Not surprisingly, they accuse the Brotherhood of abandoning religious purity for political compromise. For the Brotherhood’s part, they decry what they consider to be the Wahhabists’ needless offenses against the West and their archaic and unworkable conceptions of the Islamic state. The strategic tension between Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood is yet further magnified by Iran’s drive for regional hegemony.163 In short, the need for nuance in understanding the Islamic world has never been greater. National security policy needs to address overlapping and competing alignments grounded in six Islamic positions, accounting for the division between traditionalist and reformed Islam, divisions within traditionalist Islam, the division within Sunni Islam between Wahhabism and the Brotherhood, Iran’s drive for regional hegemony, and the power of other national and transnational Islamic organizations.164
Demographic Surveys
Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd have conducted rigorous analysis of the demographic variables represented in the 2002 Pew Report, yielding insights into Muslims who support terrorist tactics. Among the conclusions reached in their research are the following: (1) those who believe that Islam is under threat are much more likely to support terrorism, (2) those who believe that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics are substantially more likely to support terrorism, and (3) those who have a lower socioeconomic status are less likely to support terrorist acts.168 Below I focus on data from the July 14, 2005 updated report of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (henceforth, 2005 Pew Report), and the 2007 Pew Research Study, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream (henceforth, 2007 Pew Study).169 I have selected data that focus on three areas: (1) the importance of Islam for Muslim identity and political life (Tables 2, 3, and 4); (2) the Muslim perception of the meaning, and associated threats, of Islamic extremism (Tables 5 and 6);170 and (3) the level of support of Muslims for terrorist actions (Tables 7, 8, and 9).171 Values in the tables represent the percentage of responders for each specific answer to a survey question. The 2005 Pew Report establishes the primary importance of Islam for Muslim identity and political life. When Muslims were asked how they viewed themselves—as either a citizen or resident of their country first, or as a Muslim first—respondents generally answered that they were Muslims first. See Table 2.172 Table 2. Self Identity of Muslim or Citizen (Muslim respondents only) Country Muslim First Person of Country First Both Identities Equal/VR* DK/RA** This predominant religious identity carries over into the perceived role of Islam in political life. See Table 3.173 When asked how much of a role they thought Islam played in the political life of their country, most Muslims saw Islam playing a very large or fairly large role. Comparing the 2002 data to the 2005 data does not suggest an overall trend. Table 3. Role of Islam in Political Life (2002 data corrected March 3, 2007) Country Although no overall trend may exist between the 2002 to the 2005 data in Table 3, Muslims themselves believe that the religion of Islam is playing a generally greater or equal role in their countries, compared to a few years ago. See Table 4.174 Table 4. Greater or Lesser Role of Islam in Politics, Compared to a Few Years Ago Country Greater Role Lesser Role No Change/VR DK/RA The 2005 Pew Report shows the difficulty in trying to define Muslim extremism. The survey asked Muslims to define what Islamic extremism means to them by choosing between two options: (1) advocating the legal imposition of strict Shari’ah on all Muslims, or (2) using violence to get rid of non-Muslim influences in their country. See Table 5.175 Because the two options are both marks of the position of traditionalist Islam, adding the two together would likely yield the minimum number of traditionalist Muslims in each country. Strict Shari’ah and the potential use of militant jihad are marks of the position of traditionalist Islam. Table 5. What Islamic Extremism Means...Impose strict Shari'ah on all Muslims, or Use violence to remove all non-Muslim influences Country Impose Strict Shari’ah Use Violence to Remove DK/RA Turkey 48 16 36=100 After noting support for possible meanings of Islamic extremism, the 2005 Pew Report turns to the more significant question of the nature of the perceived threats posed by Islamic extremism. Individuals were asked what concerned them most about Islamic extremism in their own country. Options included: it is violent, it will lead to people having fewer personal freedoms and choices, it will divide the country, and it will set back economic development. See Table 6.176 Table 6. Perceived Threats of Islamic Extremism in One’s Country Country Is Violent Fewer Freedoms Divides the Country Sets Back Development None/VR DK/RA Additional data from the 2007 Pew Study survey seems to bear this out. Individuals were posed the following question, with responses summarized in Table 7: Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?177 Table 7. How Often Terrorist Acts against Civilians Justified (Muslim respondents only/April 2006 data) Table 7a. Muslims in Europe Justified USA* Britain France Germany Spain Table 7b. Muslims only in Muslim Countries Justified Egypt Turkey Indonesia Pakistan Jordan Nigeria Based on Table 7 data, the number of Muslims who view terrorist acts against civilians as justified often or sometimes is quite high, ranging to over 20 percent in Egypt and Jordan, and over 40 percent in Nigeria.178 To grasp the full extent of the acceptance of terrorist acts among Muslims surveyed, one must add all three categories of those who see terrorism as ever justified—often, sometimes, and rarely. I have done this below in Table 8. Table 8. How Often Terrorist Acts against Civilians Justified Table 8a. Muslims in Europe Justified USA* Britain France Germany Spain Table 8b. Muslims only in Muslim Countries Justified Egypt Turkey Indonesia Pakistan Jordan Nigeria As an example, data from Table 8 show that in the United States 13 percent of all Muslims believe that some terrorist acts against civilians can be justified. If one extrapolates this sample to the 2007 Pew Study estimate of 2.35 million Muslims in America, this could translate into as many as 300,000 American Muslims who find certain terrorist acts justified.179 By comparison, the percentages of Muslims in Egypt, Jordan, and Nigeria who responded that certain acts of terror can be justified exceeded 50 percent. This data does not appear to be anomalous. The 2005 Pew Report followed the above general question, about Muslim perception of terrorist acts being justified, with a specific question about the use of suicide bombing against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq: Were such terrorist actions justifiable or not? See Table 9.180 Table 9. Are Suicide Bombings against Americans and Westerners in Iraq Justifiable? Country Justifiable Not Justifiable DK/RA The approximately one quarter to one half of surveyed Muslims who responded that terrorist acts in Iraq against Americans and other Westerners were justifiable corresponds roughly to the data in Table 8 for Muslims within Muslim countries and their rates of ever finding terrorist acts justified. By country, there is apparent agreement between these data sets. We cannot say how many of these Muslims who justify terrorist acts would self-identify with radical, conservative, or neotraditionalist Islamic positions, all of which leave open the possibility of legitimate, violent jihad. However, it is important to note that the survey question used to gather the data for Tables 7 and 8 specifically asked about violence being justified “to defend Islam.” This is the language of jihad and, because of this, we may reasonably infer that Muslim respondents’ personal acceptance of violent jihad was reflected in their rates of finding acts of terror justified.
Part III. Religion as Paradigm in National Security Policy
We have seen that religion will continue to play a powerful role in influencing matters of conflict and security, and that nuance will be needed to address the varying positions within Islam. We now turn to consider alternative paradigms for integrating religion within national security policy. We begin with national security policy of President George W. Bush (2001-2009). Religion in the National Security Policy of President George W. Bush This view of religion as an expression of the universal value of freedom was reflected in President Bush’s 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies (henceforth, 2002 NSS and 2006 NSS).185 I will use these documents as representative of his national security policy. President Bush’s 2002 NSS was a wartime document released just one year after 9/11. It framed the global war on terrorism as a war in defense of freedom and human dignity. The broader purpose of the 2002 NSS—“to create a balance of power that favors human freedom”—aligned with its foundational assumption—that “freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization.”186 Toward the end of defending freedom within the homeland and abroad, the 2002 NSS expressed eight strategic imperatives. The first and arguably primary imperative focused on growing freedom by championing the non-negotiable components of a free society, which included “freedom of worship” and “religious tolerance.”187 Moreover, the 2002 NSS articulated policy ways to achieve these freedoms: speak out clearly about violations of these freedoms, use foreign aid to support those who struggle non-violently for these freedoms, develop these freedoms through bilateral relations, and “take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.”188 If my reading of the 2002 NSS is correct, this promotion of religious freedom was also intended to buttress the “war of ideas” against international terrorism. By supporting moderate Muslim governments in their efforts to build freer and more robust societies, the United States would make it harder for terrorists to plant their violent ideologies.189 President Bush’s 2006 NSS similarly emphasized freedom as a universal desire, but it went further by elevating religious freedom to the status of “First Freedom”: Against a terrorist enemy that is defined by religious intolerance, we defend the First Freedom: the right of people to believe and worship according to the dictates of their own conscience, free from the coercion of the state, the coercion of the majority, or the coercion of a minority that wants to dictate what other must believe.190 The 2006 NSS also offered additional policy ways to promote freedom of religion.191 Religion in the National Security Policy of President Barack Obama I didn’t become a Christian until many years later, when I moved to the South Side of Chicago after college. It happened not because of indoctrination or a sudden revelation, but because I spent month after month working with church folks who simply wanted to help neighbors who were down on their luck—no matter what they looked like, or where they came from, or who they prayed to.197 This personal faith perspective has led President Obama to articulate a positive view of religion as a force for unity. For President Obama, belief systems may vary, but all Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, and secular humanists stand united: “There is one law that binds all great religions together....the Golden Rule—the call to love one another; to understand one another; to treat with dignity and respect those with whom we share a brief moment on this Earth.”198 Based on this understanding of the essential nature of religion, President Obama has rejected as false any religion that would preach hate or condone the taking of innocent life.199 This view of religion as a force for unity is reflected in President Obama’s national security policy. To examine this view, I have used as sources the following major speeches which bear on the role of religion in his national security policy—President Obama’s January 20, 2009 Inaugural Address in Washington, DC (henceforth, Inaugural Address); his April 6, 2009 remarks to the Turkish Parliament in Ankara, Turkey (henceforth, Ankara); his June 4, 2009 “On a New Beginning” speech at Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt (henceforth, Cairo); his July 11, 2009 “New Moment of Promise” speech to the Ghanaian Parliament in Accra, Ghana (henceforth, Accra); his November 10, 2009 remarks at the memorial service at Fort Hood, TX (henceforth, Fort Hood); and his December 1, 2009 “On the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan” speech at West Point, NY (henceforth, West Point).200 In his Inaugural Address, President Obama announced the beginning of a new policy of rapprochement with the Muslim world based on “mutual interest and mutual respect.” In Ankara, he began to unfold this policy by identifying three main objectives bearing on religion. The United States would work with the Muslim world to (1) “[roll] back violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject”; (2) listen respectfully, conquer misunderstandings, and seek common ground; and (3) “convey our deep appreciation for the Islamic faith.”201 Here President Obama began to edge past President Bush’s 2006 NSS position by calling on the United States to praise the religion of Islam and by implying that Muslim terrorists were not true Muslims. In a side note, President Obama also encouraged diversity of religious expression as important for building strong and vibrant societies.202 In Cairo President Obama retained his three-fold emphases from Ankara, but expanded them in his bid to make “a new beginning” with Islam. Going beyond the language of common interests with the Muslim world, President Obama spoke of a “partnership between America and Islam [that] must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t. And I consider it part of my responsibility as President of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear.” Toward that end, the President argued that the actions of terrorists placed them outside the religion of Islam.203 Moreover, he maintained that Islam participated in a fundamental unity with all religions: “There’s one rule that lies at the heart of every religion—that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. . . . It’s a faith in other people, and it’s what brought me here today.” Based on this concept of shared faith, the President challenged his Muslim audience: “We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning.”204 Retaining his previous side note, the President also encouraged his audience to embrace religious diversity to enable all people to live together. At Accra, Fort Hood, and West Point President Obama continued to portray religion as a force for unity in matters of national security. At Accra, President Obama rejected as false any religion that would define itself over against another faith: “Defining oneself in opposition to someone...who worships a different prophet, has no place in the 21st century....We are all God’s children.”205 At Fort Hood, during the memorial service that followed the shooting that left 13 dead and 30 injured, the President reasoned that all true religions were united against such acts of violence: “No faith justifies these murderous and craven acts; no just and loving God looks upon them with favor.”206 At West Point, President Obama judged al-Qaeda terrorists to be beyond the pale of true religion, having “distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents.” Returning to the language of mutual interests between America and the Muslim world, the President called for partnership in “breaking a cycle of conflict” and in “[isolating] those who kill innocents.”207 Three Paradigms for the Role of Religion in National Security Policy 1. Religion as Freedom The role of religion in the national security of policy of President George W. Bush suggests a paradigm of Religion as Freedom.208 The narrative of this paradigm runs as follows: Freedom is a universal value. All people everywhere desire to live in free societies securely, with equal rights under the law. Chief among these rights is the freedom to choose one’s religion and worship according to one’s conscience. Current adversaries such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda wield power defined by religious intolerance, intending to establish repressive rule that would deny inhabitants their freedoms. To defeat these adversaries, the long-term solution requires working within the Muslim world to build and strengthen democratic institutions, in order to protect the rule of law and individual freedoms, including the freedom of religion.209 This paradigm suggests certain national security policy options that leverage Religion as Freedom: Support moderate Muslim governments and isolate radical Muslim terrorists, to help build freer societies and to make it harder for terrorists to plant their violent ideologies of religious intolerance. Champion religious freedom and speak out clearly against religious oppression. Praise the actions of, and award foreign aid to, moderate Islamic governments that work to promote freedom of religion. Build religious freedom through linkage with other policies across all elements of national power. Work multilaterally to encourage Islamic governments to support freedom of religion and to discourage terrorists who repress such freedoms. Show religious sensitivity. Analysis of the paradigm of Religion as Freedom follows: The pros of this paradigm are that it resonates with the enduring American value of freedom; is fully transparent to the American public; enables a slightly nuanced understanding of various Islamic positions, distinguishing between those which support freedom of religion and those which do not; and takes the long view of growing peace in the Muslim world by growing institutions of freedom. The cons of this paradigm are that it emphasizes a western concept of freedom to choose and worship God over an Islamic concept to submit to God, omits any discussion of the decisive nature of Islamic unity,210 fails to promote understanding of evolving alignments within traditionalist Islam,211 and locks itself into a monolithic “freedom” framework for addressing the role of religion in future conflicts. These problems suggest that this paradigm will not find traction in the Muslim world, at least in the short run. 2. Religion as Unity The role of religion in the national security of policy of President Barack Obama suggests a paradigm of Religion as Unity.212 The narrative of this paradigm runs as follows: All religions are bound together by a universal moral law to love one another and to treat each other with dignity and respect. Religion is, in the final analysis, faith in humanity. Because of this, the religions of the world are a powerful force for unity, properly used to encourage people to work to understand each other and to resolve conflict. Any “religion” that preaches otherwise—propagating hate, violence, or opposition toward another religion—is no true religion, but only a fraud and defilement. Islam is a religion which embraces peace and rejects violence. Current adversaries such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda represent no religion, but only hate and violence. To defeat these adversaries, the long-term solution requires forming an enduring partnership with the Muslim world, seeking opportunities to honor the Muslim faith, address mutual misunderstandings, and locate and pursue mutual interests. This paradigm suggests certain national security policy options that leverage Religion as Unity: Enter into dialog with all Muslim governments in order to show honor to Islam, resolve mutual misunderstandings, pursue mutual interests, and especially to isolate violent terrorists. Integrate the strategic communication that all true religions are a powerful force for unity through their common commitment to love humanity, spread peace, and reject violence. Champion Islam as a religion of peace, and fight negative stereotypes. Praise the actions of, and award foreign aid to, moderate Muslim governments which work to resolve disagreements through dialog and non-violent means. Work multilaterally to encourage Islamic governments to marginalize violent ideologies and to enact policies that show dignity and respect to people of all faiths. Show religious sensitivity. Analysis of the paradigm of Religion as Unity follows: The pros of this paradigm are that it resonates with many Muslims through its praise of Islam, undercuts certain terrorist recruitment arguments which vilify the West, leverages religion as a force for unity, takes an immediate view of growing peace in the Muslim world through open dialog with all Muslim governments, and promotes some understanding of evolving alignments within traditionalist Islam through open dialog. The cons of this paradigm are that it employs a concept of religious unity that assesses a moral equivalence between world religions, which traditionalist Muslims do not accept; generalizes Islam into a caricature of peace, failing to provide a nuanced understanding of varying Islamic faith positions or to address data that show support for terrorist tactics between 22 percent and 69 percent in certain Muslim countries;213 appears to lack full transparency to Americans who are aware of rates of Muslim support for terrorism; omits any discussion of the decisive nature of Islamic unity;214 and locks itself into a monolithic “unity” framework for addressing the role of religion in future conflicts. These problems suggest that this paradigm will run headlong into serious difficulties in the long run. 3. Religion as Ideology The preceding discussion of the paradigms of Religion as Freedom and Religion as Unity shows how hard it is to locate an adequate framework for integrating religion within national security policy today. Each paradigm has its own strengths and weaknesses, but neither rises to the level where its discussion of religion contributes robustly to the promotion of national security. We must certainly value the strengths of these paradigms. Each paradigm brings an important truth to the table. We should understand freedom of religion as a necessary component of free and robust societies, and work to plant and nourish that freedom. It is also true that religions often share a moral commitment to care for one’s neighbor, and that cooperative ventures to meet human needs can build human trust. Each paradigm rightly encourages respect for religious expression and commitment. That said, we must also account for the weaknesses of these paradigms. Taking a step back and looking at the entire policy formulation process, the reason for the weaknesses becomes clear. Although each paradigm brings an important perspective to the table, each does so apart from a prior assessment of Islamic power within the strategic environment. It is all well and good to begin with the enduring values of the United States (as the Religion as Freedom paradigm does), or liberal democratic values (as the Religion as Unity paradigm does), and then to frame national interests in terms of those values. But policy rests not only on national interests, but also on a grand strategy and strategic vision that comprehend strategic power and threat. Operationally the adversary always gets a vote. To frame the adversary in terms of our enduring national values or liberal democratic values—which is essentially what each of these two paradigms does—will ensure that our strategic vision and policy, although partially correct, are fundamentally flawed. The adversary must be known in terms of his values, his center of gravity, and his objectives. Effective policy rests on the creative interplay of our values which beget our national interests, with our strategic vision which comprehends the nature of the power of an adversary. This means that there can be no adequate determination of the role of religion in national security policy apart from a logically prior and accurate assessment of an adversary and his power. In the case of our current adversaries, this means that we must first understand radical Muslims and terrorists by way of their values, their center of gravity, and their objectives. To the extent that these are based in religion, we must understand their view of, and participation in, Islam as power. Only then can policy makers bring our values-generated interests to bear on the adversary’s power as it actually exists. This suggests a new paradigm for the role of religion in national security policy. If at the level of grand strategy and strategic vision religion matters as a source of power, then at the level of policy religion matters as a source of behavior. Religion motivates, enables and directs behavior which can have consequences for national security. In this sense we are not discussing religion in its capacity as divine path, but religion in its capacity as ideology, i.e., as a moral framework of ideas that drives actions, values, and objectives. This is what I mean by the paradigm of Religion as Ideology. This paradigm is particularly important because the federal government of the United States is religion-neutral.215 There is no place in United States national security policy for religion in the capacity of advocate for one faith or judge of another, but only for religion in its capacity as empowerment of human behavior. The focus must not be on belief, but on behavior. Such empowered behavior must be in view as national security policy frames its options to influence behavior toward the ends of our grand strategy in support of our national interests. This is especially critical because religious behavior frequently reflects the fullness of human aspiration in light of the breadth and depth of the human condition. Part II of this paper attempted to provide the underpinnings of an estimate for a grand strategy and strategic vision that comprehends Islam as power. The paradigm of Religion as Ideology would argue the necessity of contextualizing this understanding of Islam as power before generating related national security policy options. First distinguish Islamic actors at the transnational, national, regional, and local levels by their behaviors. Identify their actions which demonstrate their understanding of jihad, their concept of universalizing Islam, their position relative to alignments within traditionalist Islam, and their support of terrorist violence. Second, for analytical purposes, aggregate those actors which demonstrate similar actions, values, and objectives. Only then formulate policy options, in light of our values-generated interests. Examples of policy options might include: Integrate the strategic communication that the United States is committed to enhanced freedom, peace, and prosperity for its Muslim friends, but will oppose all those who use violence to achieve their political ends. Informed by the above critical distinctions regarding Islam as power, issue statements that articulate ideological differences between Islamic actors in terms of behaviors and objectives, taking care to neither praise nor judge the religion of Islam. In these statements identify positive actions such as participating in peaceful dialog and consensus building, committing publicly to peaceful coexistence with those of different faiths, protecting broader freedoms, honoring the value of every human life, showing respect for religious diversity, and meeting critical human needs. Also identify negative actions such as violence and repression against innocents, against women, and against those of other faiths; support for terrorism; and destruction of infrastructure. Enact a diversified policy of engagement with a continuum of rewards and support for actors with positive behavior, and consequences for actors with negative behavior. Use this diversified policy to move Islamic groups and governments incrementally toward the positive end of the spectrum. Work multilaterally wherever possible to support moderate Muslim governments and isolate radical Muslim terrorists by revealing the full costs of their actions. Use available elements of national power, both soft and hard, to support our national interests and the mutual interests we hold with the Muslim world. Synchronize policy actions across the interagency. Show religious sensitivity. Encourage respect for religious commitments. The advantages of the paradigm of Religion as Ideology are numerous. First, this paradigm is based on a strategic vision that comprehends the power of Islam understood in terms of varying concepts of universalizing Islam, different forms of jihad, evolving alignments within traditionalist Islam, and various levels of support for terrorist violence. Second, it promotes a more nuanced understanding of different Islamic groups based on their behavior. Third, it allows a diversified continuum of “carrot and stick” responses based on the relative behaviors of actors. Fourth, it brings the fullness of American values to bear through articulated national interests vis-à-vis national security issues, without the limitations inherent in monolithic paradigms such as Religion as Freedom, or Religion as Unity. Fifth, it should appeal to moderate Muslim governments as the United States works multilaterally to pursue mutual interests and isolate terrorists. Sixth, it conforms to the traditions of the religiously neutral federal U.S. government, neither advocating for nor detracting from any religion, but only focusing on behaviors in light of national security concerns. Finally, the paradigm of Religion as Ideology should appeal to the American public as fully transparent. There are, nonetheless, at least two risks associated with implementing this paradigm. First, changing from the paradigm of Religion as Unity to the paradigm of Religion as Ideology might appear to some western and moderate Islamic audiences to signal a new, negative orientation toward Islam. Second, terrorist recruiters might seize on the changed rhetoric of a United States no longer praising Islam as yet further justification for fighting the West.
Part IV. The Way Ahead
Part I of this paper has shown that religion matters and will continue to matter in national security challenges for the foreseeable future. Toffler, Fukuyama, Huntington, and Kaplan may point to different root causes of future conflict, but all emphasize religion as a critical component in policy that would address those challenges. This is all the more true because religion frequently reflects the fullness of human aspiration against the sobering reality of the human condition. The analysis of the power of Islam in part II of this paper has revealed an Islam that is far from monolithic. Islam today is manifested in many forms, reflecting multiple perspectives on how the faith is to achieve its universalization, on what jihad means, and on when, if ever, terrorist tactics are justifiable in defense of Islam. Traditionalist conceptions of Islam maintain the continuing applicability of Shari’ah as state law, and the potentiality for jihad as warfare, with an average of over 20 percent of Muslims in Muslim-majority nations finding terrorist acts at times to be justifiable in defense of Islam. Liberal and post-modern reformists, on the other hand, generally condemn violent jihad and seek peaceful relations with the West. An accurate assessment of Islam as power will inform that grand strategy and strategic vision on which effective national security policy rests. A review of the national security policies of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama in part III has demonstrated the incredible difficulty of bringing religion to bear within national security policy. Weighing the alternative paradigms of Religion as Freedom, Religion as Unity, and Religion as Ideology, I have suggested that the last paradigm offers the greatest utility. It calls for a strategic vision that comprehends the power of Islam, it enables a nuanced understanding of Islamic groups based on their behavior, it facilitates a diversified continuum of policy rewards and consequences based on that behavior, and it refrains from violating the American tradition of the federal government neither advocating for nor judging a religion. Certain practical matters will need to be addressed if religion is to gain currency within national security policy. If we move closer to the paradigm of Religion as Ideology, it will be important to head off any erroneous public perception that the United States is shifting to a negative strategy toward Islam. U.S. officials will need to state emphatically that America has no policy for or against any religion, that we promote full freedom of worship, and that we seek partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect with people of all religions. Actions will need to follow these words. The United States will need to reach out with renewed vigor through diplomatic summits and multilateral engagements with the Muslim world to build consensus wherever possible. Certainly this would include partnership in the continued defense and support of peaceful Islamic governments against terrorist violence. To support a more robust role of religion in national security policy, United States combatant commands should consider ways to include religion in all campaign design and planning. Campaign design activities include framing and reframing the operational environment, problem, and operational approach. Designing with religion in mind will help combatant commanders better understand their actual environment, grasp the deep roots of complex problems, and create opportunities to provide enduring solutions. Campaign planning should also include vigorous consideration of religion. In current overseas contingency operations, religion contributes directly to stakeholder identity, power, strategic alignment, and operational outcome. To strength planning, one option would be to integrate religion as a phased line of effort (LOE) in addition to current LOEs defined by political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII) systems.216 This would raise religion’s operational significance, but might risk reducing its human significance if religion were to become merely a manipulated element of power. Another option would be to add religion as a supporting objective under both the political and social LOEs. This would again raise religion’s operational significance, but might additionally elucidate its human significance within political and social systems. Religion must be understood as a power directing, guiding, and living through the behavioral choices of its adherents across formal and informal political, social, and cultural systems. An issue of supreme importance will involve calculating the strategic room needed for various conceptions of achieving the universalization of Islam. As part II of this paper has argued, the critical issue for Islam today is determining how the faith will achieve its final vision of unity. Various positions within Islam answer this question differently—radical Muslims through the mechanism of militant jihad, conservative Muslims through the vision of a united ummah living under Shari’ah, neotraditionalist Muslims through an updated integration of Islamic tradition within their respective societies, reformed Muslims through a determination and application of enduring Islamic principles to enable Muslim life in modern societies, and secular-state Muslims through a private and community practice of Shari’ah that excludes the power relations of government. In all cases, policy makers will need to understand the conceptions of universalization to which various Islamic positions aspire. Even more, policy makers will need to determine how much active support or passive space the national interests of the United States can afford or allow toward the fulfillment of those aspirations. Knowing the parameters could amount to a national security imperative. Finally, that religion will continue to matter, and matter a lot, in the national security challenges of the United States may be a bitter pill for secularist western liberals to swallow. Certain political advisers, academics, and senior leaders of the professions of arms may find it difficult to believe that many 21st century people are still motivated by religion, and that some are even willing to fight and die for their beliefs. Their incredulity is easy to document. National security policy statements, academic texts on cultural frameworks, and even military manuals on counterinsurgency doctrine can discuss their subject matter without examining religion as a power which motivates human behavior. I encourage all to rethink their assumptions and reengage in these critical arenas. About the Author
Endnotes National security policy rightly addresses both internal and external threats that impact the enduring beliefs, ethics, and values; the national interests; and the grand strategy of the nation state. This paper largely bypasses discussion of internal threats, in order to focus on external threats and the role of religion in visualizing and meeting those threats. APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF KEY ISLAMIC TERMS
Set as favorite
Bookmark
Email this
Hits: 29454 Comments (0)
 Write comment
You must be logged in to post a comment. Please register if you do not have an account yet.
|
||||
| Last Updated on Wednesday, 09 September 2015 11:22 | ||||
